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Child Pornography and Child Molestation:
One and the Same or Completely Separate Crimes?

I.
Introduction
Fifteen years ago, in developing the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,
Congress found that, "child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual
abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites." 1 The acts of possession of
child pornography and child molestation are seemingly distinct crimes; however, recent
studies have highlighted the adjunctive nature of the underlying behavior of both crimes.2
Three recent Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have created a division that is
inconsistent with these studies.3
These three court of appeals decisions affect the federal circuits by blurring the
threshold used to determine when probable cause is established.4 The Eighth Circuit held
in United States v. Colbert that a magistrate judge reasonably approved a search of
defendant' s home in order to locate child pornography when there was evidence the
defendant attempted to entice a young girl. 5 The court found that probable cause existed
because "individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child pornography
to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.,6 Contrary to the decision in Colbert, the Sixth
Circuit found in United States v. Hodson that approval of a search warrant was not
justified and therefore, the search for child pornography was not supported by probable
1

Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996).
See Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study ' Redux: A Report ofthe Incidence of
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009).
3
See United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469, 179 L.Ed. 2d 312
(U.S. 2011); United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110
(2d Cir. 2008).
4Jd.
5
Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577 (8th Cir. 2010).
2

6Jd
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cause. 7 The affidavit used in Hodson was based on defendant's online confession to an
undercover officer that he had an attraction to children and that he had sexually molested
a seven-year-old boy. 8 Similarly, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Falso that a
search for child pornography was not supported by probable cause where the affidavit
was based in part on evidence that defendant had previously been arrested for sexually
abusing a minor. 9
These cases illustrate an important issue: the absence of a bright line rule to
determine when evidence of child molestation can be used to support probable cause to
search a defendant's home for child pornography. While the totality of the circumstances
could, in some instances, allow a magistrate judge to find probable cause, there are many
other instances where probable cause might not be found. 10 The inherent dangerous
nature of these two crimes present a compelling dilemma in those events where probable
cause cannot be established to directly link these two crimes. On the other hand, by
adopting a bright line rule to link the crimes of child molestation and child pornography,
the Court gives in to their precedential reluctance of interfering in "private" spheres.
Grappling with and reconciling these two conflicting issues defines the underlying theme
of this Comment.
Two increasingly problematic issues for law enforcement are the growing
technology of the Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornographers can hide

7

Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292.
ld at 287-88.
9
Falso, 544 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
1
Compare United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App'x 961 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[s]tanding alone, a high incidence
of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child
molester is likely to possess child pornography.") with United States v. Haynes, 160 F. App'x 940 (11th
Cir. 2005) (Officers' belief that probable cause of child molestation supported a search for child
pornography was objectively reasonable, based on no more than "common sense.").
8

°
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images. 11 Traditional investigative techniques are no longer useful to prevent the
victimization of innocent children. Additionally, child pornographers do not fit neatly
into any existing, traditional Fourth Amendment category. Consequently, the best
response the judiciary has been able to muster to combat the societal danger of child
pornography has been to engage in a balancing test. However, as evidenced by the
current circuit split, an unguided judicial balancing test is too subjective to serve as a
reliable decision-making formula. To determine whether probable cause exists to support
a search for child pornography, courts, law enforcement, and society as a whole need a
more lucid standard.
Therefore, the proposed solution is to emulate the broadened probable cause
standard used in obtaining search warrants relating to drug crimes. 12 In certain cases,
courts have expanded the probable cause standard and considered the background and
training of the affiant, the severity of the crime, readily available, reliable statistics, and a
development of the nexus between the crimes and the particular place to be searched. If
law enforcement officers are able to use certain evidence of crimes dealing with the
sexual exploitation of children as a way to infer the necessity of a search for child
pornography, then every member of society may be subject to a search on exactly the
same grounds. This broadened standard will serve as a concrete guidepost for the
judiciary, law enforcement personnel, and society in general. Such a standard has the
potential to be used as prima facie evidence that a questionable search is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.

11

National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis, Lanning,
Kenneth V. (5th Ed. 201 0), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en US/publications/NC70.pd[ (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011).
12
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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This comment will proceed in three parts. Part II will begin by detailing the
history of the growth of child pornography and sexual abuse of children. This section
will also discuss the historical development of child pornography laws, as well as the
historical progression of the Fourth Amendment. Part III will provide a discussion of the
current debate on the correlation between child pornography and child molestation and
how this problem affects the federal circuit courts. By focusing on an in depth analysis
of recent circuit court cases, this Comment will specifically target issues in developing
probable cause to search for child pornography.
Part IV identifies a potential solution to this problem: child pornography is a form
of child abuse and as such, a different, more expansive probable cause standard should be
developed. By building on Parts II and III, this section will suggest a new, expanded
approach to determining probable cause in situations involving evidence of child
exploitation. Part IV will also examine the practical ramifications of implementing the
proposed broadened probable cause standard. This section will argue that by mildly
conflating child exploitation crimes, it will alleviate confusion and inconsistencies
regarding the process of determining probable cause.

II.
Background

A. History ofPornography in General
The first, full-length, English language pornographic novel, "Memoirs ofa

Woman ofPleasure," also known as "Fanny Hill," was published in 1748. 13 Despite the
reticent public attitudes toward sex at that time, pornographic novels left little to the

13

The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, available at
http://www .foxnews.com/health/20 10/1 0/13/history-pornography-prudish-present/.
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imagination. 14 The author of ""Fanny Hill" managed to cover bisexuality, voyeurism,
group sex, and masochism, among other topics. 15 With the advent of photography in
1839, pornographers were exposed to unparalleled innovation in the pornography genre. 16
Video followed a similar groundbreaking path. 17 By 1896, filmmakers in France were
exploring pornography with short, silent clips like HLe Coucher de la Marie," in which
an actress performed a strip tease. 18
The cultural and sexual revolution of the 1960's and 1970's led to changing social
mores, which opened the door for public showing of explicit films. 19 The subsequent
development of the Internet and the invention of the digital camera lowered the barriers
to making, viewing and distributing pornography. 20 Today, while pornography continues
to inundate the Internet, the actual size of the industry remains a mystery. 21
B. Setting the Stage for Conflict: Efforts to Criminalize Child Pornography
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court, faced with competing interests, ruled
that obscene material was not protected under the First Amendment's guarantee of
Freedom of Speech.22 In Miller v. California, the Court acknowledged the "'inherent
dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression," and said, "'state statutes
designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited."23 In an attempt to set
such limits, the Court defined obscene material as that which, when taken as a whole,

14ld
15ld
16ld
17Jd
18Jd
19
The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, available at
http://www .foxnews.com/health/20 1011 011 3/history-pornography-prudish-present/.
20

Jd

21
22

ld.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

23

Jd at 23-24.
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appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of community standards, and
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value?4
Congress's first step toward protecting children from child pornography occurred
with the passage of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977?5
This legislation prohibited the use of children under the age of sixteen in making sexually
explicit material to be distributed in interstate commerce? 6 However, this bill only
regulated the commercial sale of child pornography, not the trading of such material. 27
Five years later, the Court in New York v. Ferber held that the distribution and
sale of even non-obscene child pornography could be criminalized? 8 The Court found
that child pornography could be banned without first being deemed "obscene" under

Miller for five reasons: (1) The government has a very compelling interest in preventing
the sexual exploitation of children; (2) distribution of visual depictions of children
engaged in sexual activity is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children;29 (3)
advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic motive for producing
child pornography; (4) visual depictions of children engaged in sexual activity have
negligible artistic value; and (5) recognizing and classifying child pornography as a
category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible
with the Court's earlier decisions. 30

24

Jd at 24.

25

Pub. L. No. 95-225,92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423,2251-53 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
26ld
27
Amy E. Wells, Comment, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the Problem of
Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 Okla. L. Rev. 99, 102 (2000).
28
New Yorkv. Ferber, 458.U.S. 747,756 (1982).
29
The images serve as a permanent reminder of the abuse, and it is necessary for government to regulate
the channels of distributing such images if it is to be able to eliminate the production of child pornography.
30
Jd at 756-64.
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In 1984 Congress passed the Child Protection Act/ 1 which went a step further,
eliminating the need for a commercial transaction and raising the statutory age of a minor
to eighteen. 32 Finally, in 1988, the first law concerned with the nexus between computers
and child pornography was passed. 33 The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement
Act prohibited the use of computers to distribute child pornography.

34

In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court extended it's holding in Ferber and
upheld state criminal sanctions for the private possession of child pornography. 35 By
outlawing the possession of child pornography, the government sought to eradicate
legitimate harms by diminishing the market for child pornography. 36 With the advent of
the Internet and increasing technologies, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 199637
("CPPA") was developed to restrict child pornography on the Internet, including virtual
child pornography.38 In the words of one court, "[t]he regulation ... shifted from
defining child pornography in terms of the harm inflicted upon real children to a
determination that child pornography was evil in and of itself, whether it involved real
children or not."39
However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court considered whether the
CPPA's provisions regarding virtual pornography abridged the constitutional guar~tees
31

Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U .S.C. §§
2251-53 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
32
Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing "Virtual" Child Pornography Under the Child Pornography
Prevention Act: Is It Really What It "Appears to Be?" 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 393, 396 (2001).
33 Id
34
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998)).
35
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1697, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1990).
36
Id at 103.
37
Child Pornography PreventionAct of1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. N 1998).
38
18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
39
Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual
Antithesis, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2783 (2001) (citing Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
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of the First Amendment. 40 While the Court recognized that Congress was free to pass
valid laws to protect children from abuse, 41 they also noted that it was well established
that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our
sensibilities.42 The CPPA statute at issue included provisions that covered materials
beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller. 43 Thus, the Court held that the
prohibitions of CPPA §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) were overbroad and
unconstitutional. 44
More recently, in a 2011 Washington University Law Review Article, Carissa
Byrne Hessick notes that the legislative and judicial responses to the modem increase in
child pornography have been uniformly draconian. 45 State and federal governments have
drastically increased the criminal penalties for crimes involving child pornography.

46

The underlying dialogue adjoining the push for increased sentences suggests an
assumption that those who possess child pornography are indistinguishable from those
who actually abuse children.47 This rhetoric takes several forms:
Some argue that penalties for possession of child
pornography should be increased because it is a crime that
is equivalent to, or worse than, the act of sexually abusing a
child. Others contend that possession of child pornography
40

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1396, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241,2251.
42
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245 (see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 117 S.
Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) ("In evaluating the free speech right of adults, we have made it perfectly
clear that '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment."')
43
Jd 535 U.S. at 256.
44
ld at 258 (The CPPA expands the federal prohibition on child pornography to include not only
pornographic images made using actual children, 18 U,S.C. §2256(8)(A), but also ''any visual depiction,
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer generated image or picture" that
"is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §2256(8)(B), and any sexually
explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §2256(8)(D)).
45
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U.L. Rev.
853, 855 (2011).
46ld
47 ld
41
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must be punished severely because possession creates an
increased risk that an individual will sexually abuse
children. And still others seem to treat prosecutions for
possession of child pornography as a proxy for prosecuting
those who sexually abuse children; in other words, because
those who possess child pornography are assumed also to
sexually abuse children, the punishment for child
pornography possession ought to be calibrated to punish
child sex abuse as opposed to merely possession of child
pornography .48
The common thread throughout this underlying dialogue is that regardless how these two
separate crimes are punished, they are highly intertwined because of the inherently
dangerous risk they both present to innocent children.
Finally, the ever-changing ways that new technologies operate create new and
harder to detect opportunities for possessors of child pornography to avoid apprehension.
Law enforcement personnel and potential child pornography possessors face a highly
problematic issue when this form of secrecy intersects with the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. This issue can be resolved by mildly conflating the crimes of
child sexual abuse and child pornography. By doing so, the ability to establish probable
cause is slightly expanded without infringing on an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights.

C. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a citizen from
unreasonable searches and seizures.49 It reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

48ld
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

49

9
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 50
The United States has seen a major evolution of the Fourth Amendment and, more
specifically, the probable cause standard over the course of the past century. Beginning
in 1933, the Court announced, "mere affirmance ofbeliefor suspicion is not enough" to
support probable cause to obtain a warrant to search a private dwelling. 5 1 The Court
required more in order to protect the individual from potentially zealous law enforcement
agents entering a home without probable cause. 52 The point of the Fourth Amendment is
not to deny law enforcement the support of usual inferences that reasonable men might
draw from evidence.53 Instead, the protection requires that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being drawn by the officer engaged in the
often-competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime. 54
With regard to the responsibilities of the neutral and detached magistrate, the
Court in fllinois v. Gates stated that, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."55 The Court's precedent has established that
probable cause is not a standard formally set in stone. Instead, probable cause is a fluid
concept that focuses on "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act."56 The fact that the
probable cause standard is such a fluid and nebulous concept can lead to a multitude of
ld.
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S.Ct. 11, 13, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933).
52
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13~14, 68 S.Ct. 367,369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
53 ld.
54ld
55
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,214, 103 S.Ct. 2317,2320,76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
56
ld at 231.
50

51
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problems in trying to obtain a search warrant. Inconsistency and uncertainty abound
when a law enforcement agent can submit an affidavit to one magistrate and obtain a
search warrant, yet be denied a search warrant by a different magistrate evaluating the
same affidavit.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Intersection of Child Molestation and Child Pornography

A scholarly and legal debate exists as to whether there is simply a correlation
between child molestation and child pornography or whether there is actual causation
between these two crimes. This Comment seeks to determine whether this debate really
matters. Even without evidence to support causation, if these two crimes are so highly
correlated that they are almost one and the same, should not evidence of one support
probable cause to locate evidence of the other? In response to a 2009 American Bar
Association article written by Mark Hansen about the sentencing laws for child
pornography offenders, the Department of Justice suggested that, "setting aside whether
there is a causal connection or even a correlation between child pornography and child
molestation, those who collect child pornography exploit and victimize the children in
those images, and create a demand for the production of more child pornography,
regardless of whether they have ever personally molested a child."57
A study done by Michael L. Bourke of the United States Marshals Service and
Andres E. Hernandez of the Federal Correction Institution located in Butner, North
57

Alexandra Gelber, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Response to "A Reluctant Rebellion" 8-9 (2009), available at
http://www .usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf; Mark Hansen, American Bar
Association Journal, A Reluctant Rebellion, Laws are tough on child pornography. But some federal
judges think the time isn't fitting the crime, (2000), available at
http://www .abajoumal.com/magazine/article/a reluctant rebellion/.
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Carolina, gathered further empirical evidence of the debate over the link between these
two categories of crime. 58 The study compared two groups of child pornography
offenders who were participating in a voluntary treatment program: men whose known
sexual offense history at the time of sentencing involved child pornography, but did not
include any "hands-on" sexual abuse, and men convicted of similar child pornography
offenses, but who had documented histories of hands-on sexual offenses against at least
one child victim. 5 9 The goal was to determine whether the former group's offenders were
"merely" collectors of child pornography at little risk for engaging in hands-on sexual
offenses, or if they were contact sex offenders whose criminal sexual behavior involving
children, with the exception of Internet crimes, went undetected. 60
The findings of the study showed that the Internet offenders in the sample were
significantly more likely than not to have sexually abused a child via a hands-on act. 61
This study also reported a 2,3 69% increase in the number of contact sexual offenses
acknowledged by the treatment participants from the time of their Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report to the time of the study. 62 As the authors stated:
This dramatic increase . . . challenges the often-repeated
assertion that child pornography offenders are 'only'
involved with 'pictures.' It appears that these offenders are
far from being innocent, sexually 'curious' men who,
through naivete or dumb luck, became entangled in the
World Wide Web. [L]ess than 2% of subjects who entered
treatment without known hands-on offenses were verified
to be 'just pictures' cases. 63

58

Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009), available
at http://bcsdcvbercrimes.com!Documents/Hernandez%20Studv. pdf.
59
Jdat183.
60 ld.
6lld
62
ld at 188.
63 ld
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The Butner Study calls into question whether it is pragmatically and theoretically
useful to discriminate between child pornographers and child abusers. 64 The authors of
the study believe that a complex and reciprocal interaction between the two crimes
exists. 65 Likewise, the results of the study suggest that our society may be faced with a
new category of offending; that is, that many Internet child pornography offenders may
be undetected child molesters and that their use of child pornography is indicative of their
paraphilic orientation. 66

B. How This Problem Affects the Federal Circuits
The leading cases that attempt to answer the question of whether evidence of
child molestation can be used to support probable cause to obtain a search warrant to
locate child pornography have wholly different factual bases. 67 But, the difficult
balancing act between the protection of innocent minors and the privacy of the individual
is the common theme throughout all of the cases heard by the circuit courts. 68

1. United States v. Colbert- Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Colbert69 , which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court
in February 2011, detectives of the Davenport, Iowa police department drove to
Vandeveer Park to investigate a complaint of suspicious activity related to a young girl. 70
The detectives spoke to the child's uncle who had become concerned after observing a
man interacting with his five year old niece, pushing her on a swing, and talking to her
64

Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183, 188 (2009),
available at http://bcsdcy bercrimes.com/Docum ents/Hernandez%20Study. pdf.
65
Jd at 189.
66
ld at 190.
67
See supra note 3.
68ld.
69
United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469, 179 L.Ed. 2d 312
(U.S. 2011).
70
ld at 575.
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about movies and videotapes he had at his home. 71 The police obtained a description of
what was later determined to be the defendant Donald Gene Colbert's vehicle. 72 While
the detectives were still at the park, two patrol officers identified the vehicle and stopped
Colbert. 73 He consented to a search of his car and agreed to speak with the detectives. 74
Inside the car, the detectives found a police scanner, handcuffs, and a hat bearing the
phrase "New York PD."75 Colbert told the officers that he had the handcuffs because he
had been employed as a security guard four years earlier?6 He then admitted to speaking
to the young girl at the park about movies that he had at his apartment. 77
The detectives relayed this information to another detective who drafted a warrant
application seeking permission to search Colbert's residence for books, photos, videos,
and other electronic media depicting "minors engaged in a prohibited sexual act or in the
simulation of a prohibited sexual act."78 All of the facts relating to the incident in the
park, as well as the detectives' interaction with the defendant, were summarized in the
warrant application. 79 An Iowa District Court judge issued a search warrant for Colbert's
apartment. 80 The subsequent search resulted in the discovery of a number of children's
movies, a computer, and numerous CD's containing child pomography. 81 Colbert
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. 82 As stated in the case, the
issue the court attempted to answer was whether the facts set forth in the affidavit,
?lid.
72 Jd.
73 Jd.
74Jd.
75
Colbert, 605 F.3d at 575.
76 Jd.
77 Jd.
78 Jd.
79 ld.
80
ld. at 576.
81
Colbert, 605 F.3d at 576.
82 ld.
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detailing evidence of enticement of a minor, establish a link supporting probable cause to
search a defendant's home to locate child pornography. 83
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa concluded that
the information regarding enticement established probable cause to search defendant's
apartment because "individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child
pornography to reduce inhibitions of their victims." 84 More specifically, the court felt
that sexual depictions of minors could be logically related to the crime of child
enticement, particularly when defendant had referred to movies and videos that he
wanted the child to view at his apartment. 85
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affrrmed the district court's holding that
notwithstanding the affidavit's lack of detail the reviewing magistrate could have
reasonably concluded that the search of Colbert's home was justified. 86 The majority's
rationale was that there is an intuitive relationship between acts such as child molestation
or enticement and possession of child pornography.

87

The circuit court also noted that for

individuals seeking to obtain sexual gratification by abusing children, possession of child
pornography may very well be a logical precursor to physical interaction with a child: the
relative ease with which child pornography may be obtained on the internet make it a
simpler and less detectable way of satisfying pedophiliac desires. 88
Judge John Gibson dissented and was wary of the majority's opinion, stating,
"The majority relies upon a dangerous assumption in reaching its conclusion that the

83

I d. at 576-77.
ld. at 577.
85 ld.
86Jd.
87
Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.
88 Jd.
84
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affidavit satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 89 Judge Gibson asserted
that, at best, the affidavit established probable cause to believe that Colbert was involved
in the crime of child enticement. 90 The dissent also noted that even if a relationship did
exist between child enticement and child pornography, "it was unreasonable for the
magistrate judge ... to infer such a nexus without further evidence to support that
inference." 91 The dissent heavily relied on two cases, United States v. Hodson 92 and

United States v. Falso. 93
2. United States v. Hodson- 6th Circuit
On October 7, 2005, Detective Juan Passano of the Passaic County, New Jersey
Sheriffs Department Internet Crimes Section, in his search for online sexual predators,
logged onto America Online ("AOL") as "kidlatino12" and represented himself as a
twelve year-old boy .94 Once online, he encountered a user by the name
"WhopperDaddy" and conversed with him for one hour. 95 During the conversation,
"WhopperDaddy" confided that he was a forty-one year-old married man with two
sons. 96 He also shared that he was a homosexual who favored young boys, that he liked
looking at his nine and eleven year-old sons naked, and that he even had sex with his
seven year-old nephew. 97 Detective Passano subpoenaed AOL for information, which

89
90

Jd at 579.
Jd at 580.

91

ld at 580-81.
United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).
93
United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
94
I d. at 287.
95ld
96ld
97ld
92
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revealed that Michael Hodson of Middlesboro, Kentucky was registered to that screen
name.

98

Three weeks later, Passano contacted Detective Jacqualine Pickrell of the
Kentucky State Police Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force to inquire about
Hodson. 99 Pickrell verified the information she received from Passano, but discovered
that he had only one son and no known nephews. 100 Pickrell subsequently prepared an
affidavit, based entirely on the AOL information and the Internet conversation between
Hodson and Passano, and petitioned a magistrate judge for a warrant to search Hodson's
residence. 101 The affidavit's depiction of the places to be searched and the things to be
seized described and directed a search for evidence of child pornography, not child
molestation. 102 The statement of probable cause in the affidavit did not contain
information with regard to Hodson engaging in any aspect of child pornography or any
basis for believing that individuals who engage in child molestation are likely to also
possess child pornography. 103 Nonetheless, the magistrate judge issued the warrant and a
search was performed on Hodson's residence. 104 Buried in the hard drives of Hodson's
computers, the police located between ten and fifty pictures of child pornography. No
evidence was seized or subsequently discovered that would support any charge against
Hodson of child rnolestation. 105

98ld
99
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287.
100 Jd
101Jd.
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Jd. at 288-89.
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Hodson was indicted on charges of receiving and possessing child
pornography. 106 Hodson moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 107
The motion was submitted to a magistrate judge, who stated:
At best, the evidence in the Affidavit connecting Hodson to
child pornography is limited and indirect. There is a weak
inference that Hodson indulges in child pornography
because its visual quality is consistent with Hodson's
interest in simply seeing his children unclothed. Any
additional link between Hodson and child pornography,
however, would require an assumption, by the issuing
judicial officer, that a person suspected of child molestation
or an illicit online chat involving a child also possesses
child pornography .108
The magistrate declined to make that assumption. The judge was not convinced
that, standing alone, evidence of child molestation demonstrated probable cause to
believe that Hodson possessed child pornography .109 In reaching this conclusion, the
magistrate judge noted:
Certainly, a reviewing magistrate judge may make
reasonable inferences based on common sense. But, as
loathsome as Hodson's chat content was, the magistrate
judge is not equipped to supply an empirical link between
sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and pornography
possession. Such a link depends on expertise ... to support
the warrant application. 110
Having decided that the affidavit did not establish probable cause, the reviewing
magistrate proceeded to the second argument, namely whether the officer's reliance on
the search warrant was made in good faith. 111 The reviewing magistrate judge accepted
the government's argument, finding that Detective Pickrell's "failure to include her
106Jd
107Jd.
108

ld. at 290.

109Jd
110
111

Jd at 291 (internal alterations omitted).
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291.
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opinion as the critical link to establish probable cause does not reduce the affidavit to
mere suspicion or belief because "[t]hese suspected crimes are not as 'unrelated' to child
pornography as [Hodson] contends; both the cited conduct and the sought evidence

. 1ve sexual exp1o1tat1on
. . of m1nors.
.
" 112
1nvo
Both parties submitted objections to the magistrate's fmdings and the district
court conducted a hearing. 113 The district court deemed the warrant defective for its lack
of probable cause, fmding that Pickrell had failed to offer the expertise necessary to
establish a "link between sexual deviance ... and pornography possession." 114
Additionally, the district court applied the Leon good faith exception, concluding, among
other things, that "the affidavit contains information demonstrating that, at the very least,
[Hodson] was engaged in child molestation and illicit online activity. These activities are
related to the possession of child pornography in that both involve sexual exploitation of
minors." 115 The district court denied Hodson's motion to suppress the evidence and
sentenced Hodson to seventy-one months in prison. 116 Hodson appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress. 117
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the
motion to suppress, vacated Hodson's conviction, and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 118 In so doing, the court of appeals held that:
It was unreasonable for the magistrate judge in this case,
when confronted with the request for the warrant, to infer
such a nexus without further evidence to support that
inference. It is similarly unreasonable for the officer
112 ld.
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United States v. Hodson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93490 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 27, 2006).
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executing the warrant either to infer that nexus herself or to
rely on her own subjective knowledge to claim reasonable
reliance on the warrant. 119
In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta in another Sixth
Circuit case, United States v. Adkins. 120 Adkins held that, "standing alone, a high
incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not
demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography ."

121

3. United States v. Falso- Second Circuit

United States v. Falso is yet another circuit court case that further blurs the
probable cause standard in relation to child molestation and child pornography. 122 The
lower court denied Falso's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home on the
grounds that probable cause for the search did not exist. 123 The issue presented on appeal
to the Second Circuit was
Whether a substantial basis for the district court's finding
of probable cause exists where the law enforcement
affidavit supporting the search warrant alleged that Falso
appears to have gained or attempted to gain access to a
website that distributed child pornography and had been
convicted eighteen years earlier of a misdemeanor based on
sexual abuse of a minor .124

119 ld.
120

United States v. Adkins, 169 F.App'x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006).
Jd (citing United States v. Adkins, 169 F.App'x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) e'Standing alone, a high
instance of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a
child molester is likely to possess child pornography. But, the affidavit set forth other information on the
likelihood of a molester's possessing pornography, namely the FBI's "institutional knowledge[.]" This
"institutional knowledge" included the information that preferential offenders devote time, money, and
energy to the pursuit of child pornography or sexual contact with children; that they typically keep
collections of child pornography or "child erotica"; and that they have well-developed techniques for
gaining access to child pornography or child victims. This information, in conjunction with Agent Vito's
determination that Mr. Adkins is a preferential offender, supports a finding that Adkins was reasonably
likely to possess child pornography.")).
122
United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
123
Id. at 112.
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More specifically, because the court found that Falso was not alleged to be a
member of the child pornography website, but rather only that he attempted to gain
access to the site, the question on appeal hinged on whether Falso's eighteen-year old
conviction involving the sexual abuse of a minor provided a sufficient basis to believe
that evidence of child pornography crimes would be found in his home. 125 The majority
opinion held that probable cause was lacking. 126
In evaluating whether probable cause existed in the affidavit in this case, the court
first looked to the illustrated nexus between child pornography and child molestation. 127
While the affidavit in this case represented that "the majority of individuals who collect
child pornography are persons who have a sexual attraction to children" the Second
Circuit stated that this reasoning fell victim to logic. 128 The court relied on Judge
Pooler's dissenting opinion in United States v. Martin 129 that "it is an inferential fallacy
of ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A" (those who collect
child pornography) "are likely to be members of group B" (those attracted to children),
"then group B is entirely, or even largely composed of, members of group A." 130 Thus,
the court concluded that "while the district court undoubtedly had the safety of the public
in mind, an individual's Fourth Amendment right cannot be vitiated based on fallacious
inferences drawn from facts not supported by the affidavit." 131

125

Jd. at 113-14.
ld. at 114.
127
Falso, 544 F.3d at 114
128
ld. at 122.
129
United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 82 (2d. Cir. 2005).
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Falso, 544 F.3d at 122 (quoting Martin, 426 F.3d at 82 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (In Martin, Judge Pooler
criticized the majority's inference that because collectors of child pornography are likely to be subscribers
of e-groups, that the inverse also is true: namely, that subscribers are likely to collect child pornography.).
131Jd.
126
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The court then discussed whether Falso's prior sex-crime conviction was
relevant to the probable cause analysis.

132

The court determined that no such evidence of

ongoing impropriety existed in this case to bridge the temporal gap between Falso's
eighteen-year old sex offense and the suspected child pornography offense.

133

Further,

the court stated that although Falso' s prior conviction involved the sexual abuse of a
minor, it did not relate to child pomography. 134 It is not enough that the law criminalizes
both of the aforementioned crimes; they are separate offenses and nothing in the affidavit
in Falso drew the necessary correlation between a person's propensities to commit both
types of crimes. 135 The Second Circuit found no substantial basis for probable cause. 136

IV.
Potential Solution
Expanded Probable Cause Standard Limited to Child Exploitation Situations
In order to resolve the murky waters of this issue, the Supreme Court should
develop an expanded probable cause standard limited to child exploitation situations
when certain r~quirements are met. This type of expansion would not be earth shattering,

ld.
Jd. at 123.
134ld.
135
Falso, 544 F.3d at 123 . .But see United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (Second Circuit affirmed District
Court's evidentiary ruling permitting the government, in its prosecution of a defendant for traveling in
interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual contact with a minor, to present the jury
with images of child pornography found on the defendant's computer. The court explained that the
defendant's collection of child pornography indicated an "abnormal sexual attraction to children," and thus
was relevant to the offense for which the defendant stood trial, which involved the same abnormalcy. The
court then went on to say that a direct connection exists between child pornography and pedophilia. The
Second Circuit partially drew their conclusion from congressional testimony of the FBI, which noted "a
strong correlation between child pornography offenders and molesters of children and that the correlation
between collection of child pornography and actual child abuse is too real and too grave to ignore. I d. at
198 n. 17 (quoting Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the Apri/16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement by Michael J. Heinbach, Crimes
Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI)).
136
Jd. at 124.
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as it is already used consistently and analogously in cases where law enforcement seeks
to find evidence in the home of an individual suspected of association with drugs. 137
Likewise, because of the severity of crimes dealing with child endangerment, an
expanded probable cause standard allowing evidence of certain child exploitation crimes
to support probable cause for a search for child pornography is warranted by societal
norms.

A. Existing Judicial Precedent ofProbable Cause Standard as a Foundation
This new standard should not be analyzed in a vacuum and reviewing magistrates
should continue to take into account judicial precedent on ascertaining whether the
probable cause standard has been met. One important aspect that cannot be overlooked is
the notion developed in Johnson v. United States, 138 requiring a neutral and detached
magistrate to draw the usual inferences that a reasonable man could draw from the
evidence provided. This does not deny law enforcement the support of reasonable
inferences; it simply places that control in the hands of the magistrate as opposed to the
potentially zealous police officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of ferretting
out crime. 139
Additionally, magistrates should continue to abide by the 'totality of the
circumstances' approach used in Gates to determine when probable cause exists. 140 By
rejecting the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli141 two-pronged test, the Supreme Court in Gates

137

See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367,392, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
139 Id.
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Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317,76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
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Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) abrogated by Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
89 S. Ct. 584,21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969) abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.
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adopted an all-encompassing "totality of the circumstances" standard. 142 The standard
states that the issuing magistrate's task is "simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." 143 The Supreme Court hoped that this flexible, easily applied standard would
better achieve the equilibrium of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment
requires. 144

B. Analogous Situations ofan Expansion of the Probable Cause Standard
There are many examples of situations in which courts have allowed a loose
interpretation of the probable cause standard in evaluating affidavits related to drug
activity. 145 For example, the search warrant affidavit in United States v. Pace included
the police officer's contention that drug dealers normally keep records at their homes. 146

Pace dealt with a situation where police officers obtained a search warrant for a bam
located on defendant's property that officers had knowledge was being used to grow and
store marijuana. 147 On the basis of the information obtained from the search of the bam,
warrants were issued for Pace's residence. 148 During the subsequent search of Pace's
residence, officers seized a triple beam balance scale, a small quantity of marijuana, and
various business and phone records. 149

142

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

143 Jd.
144
Jd
145

at 239.
See infra note 161.
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United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270,276 (5th Cir. 1992).
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ld at 272.
148Jd

I49Jd

24

Katie Rigler
The court discussed the application of the holding of United States v. Freeman 150,
which stated that "facts must exist in the affidavit which establish a nexus between the
house to be searched and the evidence sought." 151 The affidavit must connect the
residence to be searched with the illegal activity, but this nexus may be established
"through normal inferences as to where the articles sought would be located." 152 In Pace,
the court posited that the affidavit described a sufficient connection between the illegal
activity at the barn and the expectation of what would be found at Pace's residence to
give rise to probable cause to search Pace's home. 153 This case clearly illustrates the
importance of the affiant expressly explaining the connection between drug trafficking
and the drug records that drug dealers often keep in their residences. In essence the
affiant must clearly delineate the nexus between specific criminal activity and the
particular location to be searched.

United States v. Feliz presents a similar analogous situation in which the probable
cause standard was expanded to fmd a sufficient nexus between the probable criminal
activity described in the search warrant and the evidence to be found at the particular
location. 154 In Feliz, officers submitted an affidavit containing substantial, detailed
information indicating that the defendant, Feliz, had engaged in illegal drug trafficking. 155
Feliz argued that none of the drug sales occurred at or near his apartment, and that the
law enforcement agent's experience in drug trafficking cases and his opinions regarding

150

United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982).
Jd. at 276 (citing United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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I d. at 277.
153
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the habits of drug traffickers with regard to retention of drug trafficking records and
proceeds are inadequate to supply the required nexus. 156
The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this contention. 157 The court
stated that interpreting a search warrant affidavit in the proper "commonsense and
realistic fashion" may result in the inference of probable cause to believe that criminal
objects are located in a particular place, such as a suspect's residence, to which they have
not been tied by direct evidence. 158 The most analogous reasoning in Feliz came from a
previous First Circuit case, United States v. Charest, which held that:
The nexus between the objects to be seized and the
premises searched need not, and often will not, rest on
direct observation, but rather "can be inferred from the type
of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an
opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to
where a criminal would hide [evidence of a crime]." 159
Ultimately, the Feliz court held that it was not unreasonable for the issuing judge
to have relied upon her common sense, buttressed by the affiant's opinion as a law
enforcement officer, that Feliz would likely have proceeds and records from his drug
trafficking transactions at his apartment. 160
The preceding cases demonstrate that courts have loosely interpreted the probable
cause standard in certain situations relating to drug trafficking crimes. The magistrates
issued warrants to locate evidence of a crime without any direct proof that the evidence
would be located in the defendants' homes. Subjective testimony from law enforcement
officials based on their experience and training, as well as, common sense inferences

156

ld. at 87.
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Jd. (citing United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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made by the neutral and detached magistrates allowed for these search warrants to be
approved. 161 If the probable cause standard can be broadened to account for these
specific drug related crimes, this Comment serves to defend the notion that it should be
broadened for inherently dangerous crimes involving child exploitation.

C. The Uniqueness of Child Pornography Offenders and Why the Probable
Cause Standard Should be Broadened in Relation to Child Exploitation
Crimes
The effect of sweeping technological advances on modem American society has
forced the law to adapt. Like all other areas, criminal law is no exception and must adjust
to keep pace with advancing technology. While the market for child pornography
unfortunately is not new, the advent of the Internet and increasing sophistication of
computer technology in general has made child pornography a global industry. 162
Additionally, the Internet provides sheer anonymity to all users. The success of law
enforcement officials in tracking and apprehending child pornographers depends on their
ability to stay up to date with cutting edge technological advances. 163 However, the
efficacy of law enforcement officials also hinges on the reign given to them by legislative
and judicial decisions. 164 Furthermore, all three branches of government must take great
efforts to ensure the equilibrium between the sacred individual privacy interests and the
concern over the dangers surrounding the exploitation of innocent children.
Typically, defendants who engage in child pornography present a complex and
unique barrier to law enforcement discovery. Detecting child pornography is difficult
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because those who actively possess and/or distribute the material take great pains to
conceal their crimes. 165 Often time's child pornography is not discovered until after an
individual has been arrested for a far more serious offense involving a child.

166

In this

same regard, the law has been reactive as opposed to proactive about responding to this
burgeoning social crisis.
The judiciary's willingness to adopt a broadened probable cause standard in drug
related crimes might be a result of the global 'War on Drugs' and law enforcement efforts
to reduce the illegal drug trade. While nothing in this Comment attempts to lessen the
severity and importance of reducing or eliminating the illegal drug trade, there is no
reason why this expanded probable cause standard cannot be extended to crimes
involving child exploitation. The history outlined in detail in Part II of this Comment
presents a common theme across all branches of government that crimes that victimize
children are considered abhorrent and unconscionable acts for the vast majority of
people. 167 Furthermore, the single most distinctive characteristic of habitual child
molesters is a compelling interest in collecting child pornography. 168 Thus, for many
child molesters, child pornography serves as a facilitator of this heinous crime. 169
The two competing interests in this debate are the all-American sanctity of the
individual's privacy in the home versus the overwhelming concern for the exploitation of
innocent, defenseless children. This is a hard balancing act because of the high value that
American citizen's place on their individualized privacy interests. The privacy of one's
home is a sacred interest that United States citizens cherish and value. In weighing these
165

Law Enforcement Training Network, Sex Crimes, Part 1: Child Pornography, 18 (2009).

166Jd
167

See supra Part II.

168

Jd at 6.

169ld.

28

Katie Rigler
two sides carefully, the judiciary's decisions must tip in favor of protecting the innocent
child. Child pornography presents a severe danger to innocent, defenseless children with
diminished decision-making capacities.
This expansion of the probable cause standard cannot be interpreted as providing
carte blanche freedom to law enforcement officials in obtaining search warrants. But,
when a search warrant affidavit provides (1) clear history and examples of training and
experience of the affiant in establishing and determining probable cause; (2) a detailed
description of reliable statistical data reflecting the strong correlation between specific
child exploitation crimes; and (3) a delineated nexus between the first two elements and
the particular place to be searched, in addition to the common sense, practical application
of the neutral and detached magistrate, probable cause has been established to search for
child pornography in an individual's home with or without direct evidence.
D. Practical Ramifications ofImplementing a Broadened Probable Cause
Standard
Implementing this broadened standard has the potential to create more efficiency
within the law enforcement arena, as well as provide a more manageable standard to
combat a highly secretive and extremely dangerous crime. Because of the exceptionally
high level of danger child molesters and child pornographers pose to our society, this
expansion is appropriate.
The courts are not new to altering and expanding the probable cause standard.
For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court denounced the suggestion of a rigid, all-ornothing model of justification and regulation under the Fourth Amendment. 170

170
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Furthermore, the majority opinion in Terry perfectly described the underlying notions of
the requirement of probable cause in general. 171 In assessing the probable cause standard:

It is necessary to first focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for
there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. And in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion. 172
The Court stated that an inflexible approach obscures the utility of limitations
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional
regulation. 173 Terry announced a new standard allowing a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime. 174 As Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence, the
Majority's opinion would serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and
courts throughout the land. 175 This 'stop and frisk' standard allows police officers with
articulable suspicion, something less than probable cause, to forcibly frisk and disarm
individuals thought to be carrying weapons. 176
On the other hand, the potential danger of this broadened approach to the
determination of probable cause in situations limited to crimes dealing with child
exploitation could open the floodgates for similar treatment for other types of crimes.
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This type of multifarious balancing of crimes in regards to the weight of societal interests
could easily result in a weakening of the safeguards envisioned by the framers of the
Fourth Amendment. This potential danger could also be exacerbated in the event that the
balancing is done in the frrst instance by well-intentioned, but perhaps over-zealous,
police officers as opposed to a reviewing magistrate judge. But, if this expanded
approach to determining probable cause is safeguarded in sync with the Supreme Court's
consistent refusal to intrude upon constitutionally guaranteed rights then this limited
expansion for inherently dangerous child exploitation crimes is warranted.

v.
Conclusion
While it remains true that child molestation and child pornography are two
separate crimes and that the seriousness of one crime should never be primarily based on
evidence of the other, there is overwhelming evidence that these two types of crimes are
strongly correlated. One detective in the Los Angeles Police Department estimated that
of the 700 child molesters arrested over ten years, more than half had child pornography
in their possession at the time of arrest, and roughly 80% owned either child or adult
pornography. 177 Additionally, a statement made by then Senator Joe Biden during a
congressional hearing was captured in a Columbia Law Review article as saying, "At the
heart of the analysis .. .is a very straightforward idea: Children who are used in the
production of child pornography are victims of abuse, plain and simple. And the
pornographers, also plainly and simply, are child abusers. " 178 The growing technology of
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the Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornography possessors can hide
images and deceive law enforcement creates an impossibly difficult issue of which
traditional investigative techniques are no longer useful to prevent the victimization of
innocent children.
Thus, while child pornographers do not fit precisely into any existing, traditional
Fourth Amendment category, a response by the judiciary in formulating a broadened
probable cause standard in order to search for child pornography is this nation's best
attempt at combating the societal danger created by this type of crime. The probable
cause standard is not being broadened to interfere with sexual activity between two
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home. This Comment concerns a unique
area of the law where society has already drawn special, protective boundaries in order to
safeguard innocent child victims. While this modest expansion of the probable cause
standard may appear contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
constantly attempted to strike a balance between compelling government interests and
individual privacy rights. Inevitably, with every solution there may be a slight invasion
of privacy; however, in order to combat the inherently dangerous category of crimes
involving child exploitation, this limited expansion is the fair and just result. By
emulating the already approved application of the probable cause standard for drug
related crimes, the judiciary can create an efficient and more uniform conception of
determining probable cause for crimes relating to child exploitation.
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